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ABSTRACT  
   
As the world's resources face increasing pressure from a growing 
population, it is critical that psychologists understand the motivational processes 
that lead to cooperation or defection in the context of social dilemmas. Research 
has uncovered several key strategies for encouraging maintenance of these 
resources, however, one area that remains understudied is the effect various 
emotions may have on cooperation. Furthermore, it is important to consider the 
specific type of desired behavior: reduction of consumption of a shared resource, 
or increased contribution to a shared resource. The current study takes a step in 
this direction, examining the effects of two self-conscious emotions, guilt and 
pride, on behavior in two different kinds of social dilemmas. Guilt, a prosocial 
emotion that has been described as a "behavioral interrupt mechanism," is 
predicted to increase cooperation in both a social trap game and a public goods 
dilemma game. However, its effects should be strongest in the social trap game, 
in which the desired behavior is reduced consumption. Pride, an emotion that is 
conceptually related to the constructs of status and power, is predicted to 
motivate action in both domains, by increasing both consumption in the social 
trap game and contribution in the public goods dilemma game. Results partially 
support these predictions: Whereas guilt and pride both had the predicted effects 
on consumption in the social trap game, neither had a significant effect on 
contribution in the public goods dilemma game. Individual differences are 
examined, as are the results of a Game Feedback Sheet, which yielded insight 
as to how participants understood the rules of the games, and why they chose 
the strategies they did. Results support the idea that emotions represent a 
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potentially fruitful avenue of research in social dilemma cooperation, and possible 
future directions for this research are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
OVERVIEW 
The alarming growth rate of our world population - projected to reach 9.3 
billion people by 2050 - has important implications for issues of natural resource 
conservation (United Nations, 2011). Many of these resource management 
issues fall into the category of "social dilemmas": situations in which an individual 
benefits by being selfish (by either consuming too much of a shared resource, or 
not contributing enough to a shared resource), and in which large-scale individual 
selfishness leads to long-term negative consequences to the group (Dawes, 
1980). Several types of social dilemmas have been identified, differing from each 
other in terms of the type of behaviors that constitute cooperation or defection. 
Two of the most studied and most pertinent to this discussion are social traps, in 
which people over-consume from a shared resource, and public goods 
dilemmas, in which people fail to contribute to a shared resource. Psychologists 
have discussed a number of strategies, based in behavioral science, through 
which social dilemmas can be mitigated (Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010), for 
example, by giving people immediate feedback (Petersen, Shunturov, Janda, 
Platt, & Weinberger, 2007), allowing conversation among group members 
(Brechner, 1977), or making salient social norms that encourage cooperation 
(Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990).  
One psychological phenomenon that has been understudied in terms of 
social dilemmas, but shows great promise, is emotion. According to proponents 
of the functional approach to emotions, the emotion system evolved as a 
fundamental motivator of human behavior, each emotion coordinating a specific 
subset of physiological, psychological, and behavioral mechanisms to quickly 
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and adaptively address a particular threat or opportunity in the environment 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). An important implication of this approach is that each 
emotion should facilitate a distinct behavioral response to a given situation. Of 
particular relevance to this discussion is a subset of emotions called the self-
conscious emotions, which play an important role in maintaining group cohesion 
by helping to balance the desires of the individual with the needs of the group.  
Drawing from the literatures on social dilemmas and emotion, in this 
paper I make the argument and propose the hypotheses that the self-conscious 
emotions guilt and pride may be particularly well-suited to addressing social 
dilemmas, but that the effectiveness of each will depend on the type of social 
dilemma presented. Guilt, which facilitates reparation of relationships when we 
have done something to damage our relationship with others (Keltner & Buswell, 
1996), may be experienced in response to taking more than one’s fair share of a 
shared resource because doing so is ultimately harmful to those around us. 
Because guilt promotes a desire to correct harmful actions, thereby increasing 
prosocial behavior, guilt may be effective at decreasing overconsumption in 
social traps. Guilt also may increase contribution in public goods dilemmas, 
though to a lesser extent, because guilt is thought to serve as a “behavior 
interruption” mechanism (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995), better suited to 
ceasing behavior than to facilitating action. While guilt is expected to have similar 
effects in both types of social dilemma, varying only in magnitude, pride is 
hypothesized to have opposite effects, increasing both consumption in social 
traps, and contribution in public goods dilemmas.  
Pride, which is elicited when we have engaged in a socially valued (often 
prosocial) action, may be experienced when we contribute to a shared resource 
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(Galinsky et al., 2003; Griskevicius et al., 2010). Pride serves to encourage 
continued, active prosociality (Tracy & Robins, 2007), therefore, pride may 
increase contribution to a common resource in public goods dilemmas. In 
contrast, pride may be detrimental in social dilemmas, in which the desired 
behavior is restraint. This is because pride, linked to the constructs of power and 
status, is proposed herein to facilitate proactive behavior in all domains (Galinsky 
et al., 2003). In this line of research, I will examine the effects of guilt and pride 
on cooperation and defection in social dilemma games, with the ultimate goal of 
developing effective emotion-based interventions that can be used to address the 
pressing problems of social traps and public goods dilemmas. To test these 
hypotheses, I propose a study in which I will elicit guilt, pride, or neutral affect, 
and ask participants to play either a social trap game or a public goods dilemma 
game. Individual difference measures will also be collected, to determine whether 
there are moderating variables. 
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Chapter 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Social Dilemmas in a Zero-Sum World  
Much of human evolution occurred in a world in which resources were 
scarce and survival was uncertain. The harshness of this environment 
necessitated reliance upon and cooperation with the other members of one’s 
group, who could provide protection and help with important tasks (Rubin, 2003; 
Trivers, 1971). Humans, therefore, evolved as ultra-social animals, motivated to 
maintain friendly relationships with the people upon whose mutual cooperation 
their lives depended. This ultra-sociality helped to cement group cohesiveness, 
facilitating the group’s success. However, the ultimate benefit of group success is 
not to the group, but to the individual, whose fitness is maximized through his 
affiliation and consequent access to group protection and resources (Keltner & 
Haidt, 1999). It becomes clear, then, that humans often must choose between 
two conflicting goals: reinforcing their group membership, by making cooperative 
decisions that may involve a cost to the self (Trivers, 1971), or immediately 
maximizing their own fitness, by making self-serving decisions that may deprive 
the group. These two choices are often referred to as cooperation and defection, 
and a wide variety of social problems are defined by this choice. These problems 
fall under the umbrella term social dilemma (Dawes, 1980). 
Social dilemmas generally involve a common resource (Dawes, 1980), 
from which people can draw, or to which people can contribute. Two primary 
characteristics define social dilemmas: (1) A given individual gains more by 
making the selfish/defective choice than by making the pro-group/cooperative 
choice, no matter what the other individuals do; and (2) all individuals gain more 
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when everyone cooperates than when everyone defects. In a social dilemma, an 
individual, whose outcomes are tied to both his own success and his group’s 
success, then faces a difficult decision.  
 Social traps. Social traps are a particular type of social dilemma in which 
individuals behave in ways that are immediately and personally gratifying, but are 
ultimately damaging to the group (Platt, 1973). Classic social traps involve 
overconsumption of a group resource (e.g., overfishing, the tragedy of the 
commons) (Hardin, 1968; Platt, 1973). In these cases, the defective behavior is 
consumption – individuals are proactively making consumptive choices – and the 
desired cooperative behavior is cessation of this action. Refraining from 
overconsumption can be difficult because consumption involves an immediate 
and rewarding increase in resources, but if too many individuals consume too 
much of the resource pool, it disappears and no one can benefit from it. Restraint 
also involves risk, and a need to consider the likelihood of others refraining from 
overconsumption. If an individual decides to decrease his consumption, he also 
forfeits immediate access to fitness-enhancing resources. If many others also 
decrease consumption, the resource may remain, to the benefit of all who share 
it. However, if most other individuals continue to over-consume, the resource is 
gone anyway, and anyone who refrained is worse off for not having taken from it 
while they could. 
Public goods dilemmas. Another type of social dilemma is the public 
goods dilemma, in which the problem is too little contribution: An individual 
benefits by not contributing to a shared resource (e.g., donating to a public goods 
charity, volunteering time to clean hiking trails) (Dawes, 1980). In this case, the 
goal is to encourage active contribution, but individuals’ assessments of the cost 
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and benefit of doing so may inhibit this action. By not cooperating, an individual is 
able to conserve his own resources while others spend theirs, and the shared 
resource continues to exist. But defecting is risky, because if enough other 
individuals also defect, then the shared resource may cease to exist, and 
everyone suffers. Contributing is also risky, because an individual who 
contributes his own resources may be the only one if everyone else defects, and 
if contributions are not high enough, the public good will disappear anyway, often 
taking the individual’s contribution with it. Therefore, a decision to cooperate or 
defect depends not only on one’s own resource situation, but also on his 
perception of the resources and goals of others.  
Proposed explanations and solutions. In both of these types of social 
dilemma, mass defection leads to elimination of the shared resource – an 
outcome that is detrimental to both the group as a whole and the individuals who 
belong to that group. Additionally pressing is the fact that our world is 
experiencing population growth that has resulted in 7 billion people last year 
(Moran, 2011), as well as accompanying unprecedented conflict over the 
management of shared resources. Therefore, it is crucial that we as 
psychologists continue our efforts to understand and mitigate social dilemmas. 
To that end, several theories have been proposed to isolate the causes of and 
potential solutions to social dilemmas. 
Hardin (1968) proffered an evolutionary explanation, claiming that those 
who exploit shared resources are thereby more fit than those who cooperate, and 
are thus more able to pass along the genes that predisposed them toward 
defection. To counter this evolutionary predisposition toward defection, he 
favored a solution based in infrastructure, which simply did not allow defection 
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(e.g., having a tax system that mandates contribution to the shared resource 
pool). This solution may be quite effective in some contexts, but it would be both 
unethical and logistically impossible to monitor and govern every existing shared 
resource. Other researchers (Cialdini et al., 1990; Ostrom, 2000) emphasize the 
role of social norms: When an individual knows that others in his group are 
behaving cooperatively, or that they approve of cooperative behavior, the 
individual is motivated to cooperate. Therefore, highlighting social norms around 
cooperation should increase prosocial behavior, and studies on littering and 
energy use indicate that it does (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Schultz, Nolan, 
Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). The power of social norms may be 
double-edged, however. In the case of many social dilemmas, the norm (real or 
perceived) is defection, and in these cases norms may actually compel the exact 
behavior that needs to be changed. Another explanation comes from Platt 
(1973), who pointed to the role of behavioral reinforcements, claiming that the 
immediate positive reinforcements of defection are more powerful motivators of 
behavior than the long-term negative consequences of defection, or the long-
term positive consequences of cooperation. Platt’s proposed solution was to shift 
the reinforcement structure so that the negative consequences of defection and 
the positive consequences of cooperation were immediate; indeed, the 
government has adopted this strategy with a system of fines, rebates, and tax 
write-offs. These explanations and solutions all have their strengths and 
weaknesses, but to date, none has been able to fully address the problem of 
social dilemmas. One possibly fruitful avenue that remains underexplored is 
emotional appeals. 
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Effects of Self-Conscious Emotions on Cooperative Behavior 
 Many emotion theorists take a functional approach to emotions, claiming 
that emotions evolved over the course of our ancestral history to alert us to the 
affordances of our current situation, and facilitate the most adaptive response 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Ekman, 1992; Nesse, 1990). Once elicited, emotions 
can be powerful drivers of human behavior (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). More specifically, an individual emotion will tend to 
facilitate very targeted types of behavior, these behaviors having proven 
especially appropriate in the face of the emotion-eliciting threat or opportunity.  
 When it comes to the function of an emotion, there is an important 
distinction to be made between intra-individual functionality and inter-individual 
functionality. Intra-individual functionality pertains to the direct role played by 
emotions in enhancing an individual’s fitness (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Examples 
of intra-individual functionality include the disgust response, which facilitates 
avoidance and expulsion of toxic substances, and the flight response of fear, 
which allows an individual to escape predators. In contrast, inter-individual 
functionality, sometimes called social functionality (Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 
2006) refers to the indirect ways in which emotions enhance an individual’s 
fitness. This is generally through enhancing one’s relationship with the group and 
boosting the success of the group (Tracy & Robins, 2007b), both of which 
ultimately increase one’s ability to access and enjoy group resources.  
Certain social emotions can clearly be seen to serve an inter-individual 
function. Negative social emotions, such as guilt and embarrassment, notify us 
that our place in the group is threatened, and remedial action must be taken. 
Guilt, for example, alerts us to the fact that we have somehow damaged a social 
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bond, and facilitates reparative action (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996), 
the ultimate purpose being to avoid termination of the relationship or expulsion 
from the group and denial of group resources. In contrast, positive social 
emotions such as pride and compassion signal opportunities for us to promote 
our own status within the group, or to engage in a behavior that will boost the 
group’s overall success. Pride, for instance, facilitates promotion of one’s own 
success, with the goal of increasing one’s status in the group hierarchy and 
thereby increasing access to group resources (Tracy & Robins, 2007c).  
Because evolution has shaped human behavior to be heavily reliant on 
emotions, which facilitate immediate and adaptive responses to the situation, an 
intervention based on emotions might be able to fill in some gaps left by the 
strategies previously outlined. When designing an emotion-based intervention, it 
behooves us to think about how best to target different kinds of social dilemmas 
with the emotion that is most likely to be effective at bringing about the desired 
cooperative behavior. The goal of this study is to explore this idea, beginning with 
guilt and pride, two self-conscious emotions that seem particularly well-suited, in 
different ways, to address the problem of social dilemmas. 
 Self-conscious emotions and group relations. Researchers have 
identified an important subgroup of emotions, dubbed the self-conscious 
emotions due to their enhanced awareness of the self and how others may 
perceive the self (Tangney et al., 1996). These emotions – guilt, pride, 
embarrassment, and shame – are particularly relevant to the discussion of social 
dilemmas because they help individuals balance their own desires with the needs 
of the group (Tangney et al., 2007). Self-conscious emotions do this in several 
ways. For one, they are particularly sensitive to norms, in that the negative self-
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conscious emotions (guilt, embarrassment, and shame) are all elicited by norm 
violations and serve to mitigate society’s harsh judgment of these violations and 
future adherence to the violated norm (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). The 
positive emotion pride, on the other hand, is elicited when one has done 
something that is of value to the group, or in accordance with an injunctive norm. 
The pride experienced upon having done this admirable thing serves to reinforce 
that eliciting behavior, and this may be used to advantage when the admirable 
behavior is a cooperative one. In support of this idea, research by Hart & 
Matsuba (2007) shows that pride can reinforce cooperative behavior, thereby 
increasing future cooperative behavior. With an understanding of the role the 
self-conscious emotions play in cooperative behavior, we now turn to a 
discussion of the implications this has for the effects of self-conscious emotions 
on cooperative and defective behavior in social dilemmas. 
 Guilt. The primary role of guilt is to alert us when we have done 
something that damages our relationship with others (Tangney et al., 1996), but 
in contrast with embarrassment and shame, guilt facilitates pro-active and 
prosocial reparation of the damage done. This characteristic makes guilt a 
potentially useful emotion in the context of social dilemmas, one that may 
increase cooperation across the board (i.e., in both social traps and public goods 
dilemmas). However, it seems likely that the prosocial effect of guilt will be 
stronger in social traps, in which the desired behavior is the cessation of 
overconsumption, than in public goods dilemmas, in which the desired behavior 
is active contribution. In their diary study on everyday experiences of guilt, 
Baumeister and colleagues found that in addition to often occurring in the context 
of relationships, guilt is associated with increased uncertainty and decreased 
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feelings of competency and safety (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995). The 
authors propose that guilt acts as a “behavioral interrupt” mechanism, in that it 
forces assessment of one’s actions in the context of their effect on others, and 
facilitates restraint, in the service of relationship preservation. If this is the case, 
then a guilt elicitation should facilitate a careful consideration of the effects of 
overconsumption on others, and a decrease in this consumption. 
 Pride. In contrast with guilt, pride should not necessarily lead to prosocial 
behavior. Pride is often experienced as a feeling of increased status relative to 
others, and therefore the link can be made between pride and the related 
constructs of status and power. Studies on these constructs suggest that if pride 
does indeed have similar effects on behavior as status and power, then the 
behavioral effects associated with pride may only be prosocial in certain 
circumstances (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van 
den Bergh, 2010). For example, Galinksy and colleagues demonstrated that 
when primed with power, participants were more likely to engage in action of any 
kind, whether cooperative (in a public goods dilemma game they were more 
likely to contribute to a shared resource) or defective (in a social trap game, they 
were more likely to over-consume). For this reason it is predicted that pride, like 
power, will facilitate cooperation in public goods dilemmas, and defection in 
social traps. However, there is a possible conflicting hypothesis, which is that 
pride will lead to a sense of entitlement. Experiencing pride leads to a perception 
of the self as having increased status, and higher status can merit extra 
resources (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; Tracy & Robins, 2007c). Therefore, 
pride may lead participants to act in ways that optimize their own resources, by 
increasing consumption in a social trap and decreasing contribution in a public 
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goods dilemma. The research on power and action is particularly compelling, and 
remains the basis for the current predictions, but the current study design will 
allow assessment of both of these competing hypotheses.  
Study Overview 
The goal of this research is to begin examining the effects of emotion on 
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas, beginning with the self-conscious 
emotions guilt and pride. Specifically, guilt is predicted to decrease consumption 
in a social trap game and, to a lesser extent, increase contribution in a public 
goods game. Pride is predicted to facilitate action in both games, by increasing 
both consumption in a social trap game and contribution in a public goods game. 
Additionally, it is likely that dispositional tendencies will moderate these effects. 
Specifically, those who are particularly inclined to feel guilt may be especially 
likely to cooperate when guilt is elicited, whereas those who are dispositionally 
pride-prone may be especially responsive to the pride manipulation. Finally, 
political attitudes, which often influence beliefs about distribution of resources, 
may influence cooperation and defection in these games. Multiple personality 
scales and demographic characteristics are measured to assess these 
possibilities. 
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Chapter 3 
METHOD 
This study tested the proposed hypotheses using a 3 (Emotion condition: 
Guilt, Pride, Neutral) by 2 (Social dilemma task: Social Trap, Public Goods 
Dilemma) between-subjects factorial design. Individual differences in emotion 
experience, environmental attitudes, and prosociality, as well as basic 
demographics, were also measured.  
Participants 
 Participants were 194 ASU undergraduates recruited from Psychology 
courses at Arizona State University (51% male, 49% female). Average age was 
20.9 years, SD = 3.7 years, and the ethnic breakdown was as follows: 52.4% 
Caucasian, 19.9% Hispanic, 11.5% Asian, 6.3% Arab/Middle Eastern, 5.8% 
Black, 2.1% Native American, and 2.0% Other. However, seventeen participants 
were removed from analyses, resulting in a final sample of 177 (52% male, 48% 
female). Average age was 20.9 years, SD = 3.6 years, and the ethnic breakdown 
was as follows: 52.3% Caucasian, 21.8% Hispanic, 10.3% Asian, 5.7% Black, 
5.7% Arab/Middle Eastern, 2.3% Native American, and 1.9% Other. For their 
participation, participants received one credit toward their course’s research 
requirement, or one unit of extra credit.  
Procedures 
The study took approximately one hour. Participants were run in small 
groups of 1-10 people. Upon entering the lab, participants were seated and given 
instructions for the study. They were told that their participation involved three 
separate studies: In the first, they would recall and write about a time when they 
experienced a certain emotion. In the second, they would participate in a shared 
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resource game, with the opportunity to earn money. Participants were told that 
their outcome in the shared resource game (Social Dilemma task) depended not 
only on their own decisions, but also on the decisions of everyone in the study, 
and that if the group as a whole succeeded, they would receive their money at 
the study’s conclusion. The third study would involve completion of several 
questionnaires.  
Recalled emotion elicitation. Participants were asked to recall and write 
about one of the following three emotion eliciting situations: Guilt (“Describe a 
time when you did something that harmed someone else”), Pride (“Describe a 
time when you accomplished a socially valued goal”), or Neutral affect (“Describe 
a time when you did your laundry”). Participants were instructed to write about a 
specific event, not a general period of time or type of situation, with an emphasis 
on reliving the emotions experienced during that event. They were told that if 
they finished writing before the allotted time was up, they were to close their eyes 
and continue to silently relive the experience. See Appendix C for emotion 
elicitors.  
Social dilemma games. After the emotion elicitation, participants began 
the social dilemma task – either the Social Trap Game or the Public Goods 
Game. To minimize confusion, all participants in a given session were assigned 
to the same game (i.e., there was no session in which some participants played 
the Social Trap game while others play the Public Goods game). Both games 
were based on tasks that have been successfully used in previous social 
dilemma research.  
Social Trap game. One-hundred and five participants played this game, 
which was adapted from Galinsky and colleagues (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & 
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Magee, 2003). Participants were told that there was a shared pool of $1,000, 
from which they could take any amount they like. However, there were 99 other 
people in the pool as well, who could also take as much as they like. If the 
cumulative “take” added up to $1,000 or less, each participant would receive the 
amount of money they requested. However, if more than $1,000 was claimed, 
then the resource pool would disappear and no one would receive anything. 
Therefore, it was immediately rewarding to take the money, but if people took too 
much, then everyone in the group would end up with nothing. Two examples 
were given: In Example A, the sum of all requests added up to $900, and all 
participants received what they asked for; in Example B, the sum of all requests 
added up to $1,100, and no participant received anything. Finally, participants 
were asked how much money they would like to take from the pool, from $0-
$1,000. A participant’s “fair share” of the pot was $10 ($1,000/100 participants), 
however, this calculation was not provided to them, for the purpose of avoiding 
participants anchoring their requests at $10. See Appendix D for complete 
instructions and details of this task. 
Public Goods Dilemma game. Eighty-nine participants played this 
game, which was adapted for our purposes from a game played in another 
dissertation study (Ledlow, 2005) – the original intent was to have 100 
participants, but only 89 were recruited; this did not affect the game itself in any 
way, only the ultimate pot. Participants were told that they and each of the other 
99 players in the game were starting with a “personal bank account” of $5, and 
that there was also a shared resource pool that stood at $0. All 100 participants 
had the opportunity to contribute any amount ($0-$5) from their personal account 
to the shared resource pool. Once all contributions were made, the shared pool 
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would be doubled, and divided equally (not proportional to amount given) among 
all 100 participants. Thus, at the end of the game, each participant would receive 
whatever was still left in their personal account (i.e., whatever they did not 
contribute to the pool), as well as 1/100 of the shared pool. Therefore, it was 
immediately and individually costly to contribute, but collective earnings could be 
maximized if everyone contributed. Two examples were given: In Example A, the 
sum of all 100 contributions was $200, which was then doubled to $400, so each 
participant received $4 plus whatever they had kept in their personal account. In 
Example B, the sum of all 100 contributions was $400, which was then doubled 
to $800, so each participant received $8 plus whatever they had kept in their 
personal account. After hearing instructions, participants were asked how much 
they would like to contribute to the pot, from $0-$5. See Appendix E for complete 
instructions and details on this task. 
Individual Differences 
 Several relevant personality and demographic scales were included, to be 
used as covariates and to determine whether individual differences would 
moderate the extent to which the emotions affected cooperation in social 
dilemmas.  
The Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3). Developed by 
Tangney et al. (2000), the TOSCA-3 assesses dispositional experience of the 
self-conscious emotions, by asking participants to rate their likelihood of 
engaging in each of four or five possible outcomes to sixteen different scenarios. 
Six categories of outcomes map on to the self-conscious emotions of interest: 
Shame-proneness, Guilt-proneness, Externalization, Detachment/Unconcern, 
Alpha Pride, and Beta Pride. For each scenario, there are four or five outcomes 
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(e.g., blaming others, thinking highly of oneself), each representing one of the six 
categories. Participants’ responses to the outcomes for each category are 
averaged to calculate a dispositional (cross-scenario, multi-domain) score for 
each of the six emotional responses. Of particular interest are the dispositional 
Guilt and Pride (Alpha and Beta) subscales. See Appendix F for the entire 
TOSCA-3 scale. 
Environmental Attitudes Inventory (EAI) – Subscale 8, Personal 
Conservation Behavior. The 10-item EAI Subscale 8, Personal Conservation 
Behavior, comes from a much larger 120-item scale (Milfont & Duckitt, 2010). 
This subscale measures participants’ conservation and environmental protection 
behaviors, with items such as “Whenever possible, I take a short shower in order 
to conserve water.” It is predicted that participants with high scores on this 
subscale will have generally more prosocial behavior (i.e., consume less in the 
Social Trap game, and contribute more in the PGD game), because the 
conservation items in this subscale involve prosocial behavior that often involves 
inconvenience to the self. For the entire EAI-Personal Conservation Behavior 
subscale, see Appendix G. 
Prosocial Personality Battery (PSB). The 30-item PSB (Penner, 2002) 
is a shorter version of the original 54-item PSB scale. It is composed of seven 
subscales, which measure the prosocial tendencies of participants in a variety of 
domains (e.g., social responsibility, perspective taking, and self-reported 
altruism). Sample items are “My decisions are usually based on my concern for 
other people,” and “When people are nasty to me, I feel very little responsibility to 
treat them well.” These subscales have been correlated with several constructs 
relevant to the current research, such as empathy, which is very appropriate to 
  18 
the experience of guilt, and helpfulness (Penner, 2002; Penner, Fritzsche, 
Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995). Both of these are correlated with prosocial behaviors, 
including such acts as everyday helping and willingness to serve as an organ 
donor (Penner, 2002). It is predicted that high scores on the PSB will be 
associated with greater cooperation in both social dilemma games. See 
Appendix H for the 30-item PSB. 
 Dispositional Positive Emotion Scale - revised (DPES-r). The DPES is 
a 28-item instrument developed to measure self-reported dispositional 
experience of seven positive emotions: amusement, awe, compassion, 
contentment, joy, love, and pride (adapted from Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006). 
For the purposes of this study, the sole subscale of interest is that concerning 
pride, which is composed of four items like the following: “I take great pride in my 
achievements.” It is predicted that dispositional pride will moderate the effect of 
the pride elicitor on consumption in the social trap task, and contribution in the 
public goods dilemma task (such that dispositional pride will be associated with 
increased cooperation in both games). To match this subscale in the context of 
guilt, four additional items were created (e.g., “It really upsets me when I do 
something that hurts another person”). See Appendix I for the eight items. 
Game Feedback Sheet 
The questionnaire section included a set of five questions intended to 
serve as a comprehension check for the rules and math involved in the social 
dilemma task (e.g., “Please explain the rules of the resource management game 
that you played in Study 2”; see Appendix J for the full set of questions).1 
                                                1	  After five participants had been run in the Social Trap game, it was noticed that 
two of them requested $1,000 each. It was unclear whether they had understood 
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Emotion Manipulation Check  
To determine the extent to which the recalled emotion elicitation task 
created an experience of the intended emotion, participants were asked to 
complete a short emotion manipulation check, in which they rated on a scale 
from 0 (none at all) to 8 (the strongest experience of this emotion ever) the extent 
to which they had felt 14 different emotions during the recalled emotion 
manipulation. This list included the target emotions guilt and pride. See Appendix 
K for the Emotion Manipulation Check.  
Demographic Information 
Finally, participants were asked to answer several questions pertaining to 
their demographic characteristics, including age, sex, and political affiliation. See 
Appendix L for the complete Demographic Questionnaire. 
                                                                                                                                
the game rules, so these questions were added; the game instructions were also 
rewritten to be even clearer at this time. Therefore, we do not have Game 
Feedback Sheets for these two participants. One was removed because her 
emotion story was not appropriate, and the other was removed as an extreme 
outlier, because it could not be confirmed that he understood the rules of the 
game. The other three participants who were run before the Game Feedback 
Sheet was added asked for $5, $10, and $9, all reasonable requests comparable 
with those of later participants who understood the game, indicating that they 
understood the rules and did not need to be removed from analyses. 
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Chapter 4 
RESULTS 
Emotion Story and Game Feedback Sheet  
Two checks were performed to confirm that participants had correctly 
followed directions and understood the social dilemma task. The first check was 
an experimenter reading the emotion story (Task 1), to make sure that 
participants had written about the type of situation they were asked to (e.g., in the 
Guilt condition, they must have written about a time when they harmed another 
person). Four participants were removed because they either did not write a story 
at all, or the story they wrote was not appropriate for what they had been asked 
about (e.g., one guilt participant wrote about a time she had been hurt by 
someone else; this participant also requested $1,000).  
Next, responses to the Game Feedback Sheet were examined. 
Participants whose answers indicated that they either did not understand the 
rules of the game (for example, one Social Trap participant thought the money 
was first come, first served) or did not correctly do the math (e.g., “as long as 
everyone asks for less than $100, we will all get money”) were also excluded. 
Ten participants were removed for these reasons. 
Finally, one participant was removed as an extreme outlier for requesting 
$1,000 (this was before the addition of the Game Feedback Sheet), and an 
additional two participants were removed because they arrived late, were 
disruptive, and completed the study in a different room, where they were 
overheard speaking to each other during the tasks. The removal of these 
seventeen participants left a total of 177. The remaining analyses are conducted 
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on this group of 177, 91 of whom were in the Social Trap condition, and 86 of 
whom were in the Public Goods Dilemma condition2. 
Emotion Manipulation Check  
The emotion manipulation check confirmed that the recalled stories 
successfully elicited the desired emotions. In each emotion condition, the target 
emotion was the highest-rated emotion of the 14 possible emotions. This is 
particularly noteworthy because we intentionally did not use the target emotion 
word in the task instructions, so participants could not easily determine what we 
were looking for. Specifically, in the Neutral condition, no emotion was rated 
higher than 4 on the 0-8 Likert scale (Amusement came closest, M = 3.57, SD = 
2.16). Participants in the Guilt condition rated Guilt as the strongest emotion (M = 
5.14, SD = 2.73), with Shame and Embarrassment also rated relatively high (both 
means above 4.00). Participants in the Guilt condition also rated Guilt 
significantly higher than did participants in both the Neutral condition (t[105] = 
9.01, p < .001) and the Pride condition (t[84] = 11.33, p < .001). Those in the 
Pride condition rated Pride as the highest emotion (M = 6.95, SD = 1.66), with 
Happiness as a close second (M = 6.73, SD = 1.43). Pride participants reported 
experiencing significantly more Pride than did those in both the Neutral (t[101] = 
13.00, p < .001) and Guilt (t[96] = 13.46, p < .001) conditions. See Table 1 for 
mean ratings of each emotion in all Emotion conditions.  
Three-Way Social Dilemma Game x Emotion x Sex Interaction  
                                                
2 The following analyses were also conducted using all 194 participants. The 
same pattern of results existed for all tests except for those involving the two 
outlying participants who took $1,000 from the Social Trap game; their 
exceptionally high consumption had a strong effect on all analyses. The removal 
of fourteen participants from the Social Trap game had an enormous effect on 
the overall amount of money requested from the pool. The original 105 
participants in that game requested a total of $4,370.82. Removing the two 
participants who requested $1,000 reduced the total to $2,370.82, and removal 
  22 
To test the primary prediction, that guilt and pride would differentially 
influence cooperative behavior in the Social Trap and Public Goods Dilemma 
tasks, it was necessary to standardize the dependent variables (amount taken in 
the Social Trap game, which ranged from $0-$100, and amount given in the 
Public Goods Dilemma game, ranging from $0-$5). To do that, both dependent 
variables were converted to z-scores, and then the Public Goods Dilemma z-
scores were multiplied by -1, so that a positive z-score always indicated more 
selfish behavior. With this new standardized dependent variable, a three-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, with Social Dilemma, Emotion and 
Sex predicting self-interest (Sex was added because preliminary analyses 
suggested a possible main effect of participant sex). The 3-way interaction was 
not significant, F(2, 174) = 0.04, p = .965. Nor were any of the two-way 
interactions: Emotion x Dilemma, F(2, 174) = 1.33, p = .267; Emotion x Sex, F(2, 
174) = 0.14, p = .871; Dilemma x Sex, F(1, 174) = 0.88, p = .349. None of the 
main effects were significant: Emotion, F(2, 174) = 2.10, p = .126; and Sex, F(1, 
174) = 2.56, p = .111. There was no main effect of Social Dilemma, F(1, 174) = 
0.00, p = .956, due to standardization of the dependent variable in each game.3 
Although the three-way interaction was not significant, the games differ from a 
psychological perspective, and the dependent variables differ largely in 
magnitude, so it was deemed necessary to analyze the effects of emotion on 
each Social Dilemma Game separately; these analyses follow. 
                                                
3 The three-way Social Dilemma Game x Emotion x Sex analyses and the two-
way Emotion x Sex analyses for each game were repeated seven times, using 
each of the following personality subscales as a sole covariate: TOSCA-Beta 
Pride, DPES Pride, DPES Guilt, EAI-Personal Conservation Behavior, PSB-
Mutual Concern Moral Reasoning, PSB-Other Oriented Moral Reasoning, and 
PSB-Self-Reported Altruism. None of these covariates significantly affected the 
pattern of results, therefore exact results of these covariate analyses are not 
reported here.  
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Social Trap Results 
 The sum of all 91 participant requests was $1,605.83, indicating an 
average participant request of $17.65. Because they requested more than the 
allotted $1,000, participants in this game did not receive any money. 
Two-way Emotion x Sex interaction. To test the prediction that the 
emotions would have an effect on consumption behavior in the Social Trap 
game, a two-way ANOVA was conducted using Emotion condition and Sex as 
predictors of participant requests. An Emotion x Sex interaction was not 
predicted, nor was it found F(2, 90) = 0.02, p = .979. However, there was a main 
effect of Emotion, F(2, 90) = 3.09, p = .051, with the emotions having the 
predicted effect on consumption. Means confirmed the predicted pattern of 
results, with Guilt participants taking the least amount of money from the shared 
resource (M = $11.54, SD = $9.30), Pride participants taking the most (M = 
$24.78, SD = $30.14), and Neutral participants between (M = $15.80, SD = 
$20.19). T-tests reveal that Pride participants requested significantly more than 
Guilt participants, t(58) = 2.36, p < .05. Neither the difference between Neutral 
and Guilt, t(57) = 1.06, p = .296, nor between Neutral and Pride, t(61) = 1.39, p = 
.169, were significant.  
Of particular interest was whether dispositional guilt or pride, as assessed 
by the DPES-Guilt and DPES-Pride subscales, would moderate the main effect 
of Emotion condition. For example, a participant who is dispositionally prone to 
experience guilt might respond particularly strongly to the Guilt manipulation (or 
might not respond at all, if the experimentally manipulated guilt situation did not 
produce a noticeable change from baseline guilt levels). To examine these 
possibilities, follow-up analyses were conducted to assess whether Emotion 
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condition interacted with either DPES-Guilt or DPES-Pride. This moderation was 
not significant for either DPES-Guilt, F(2, 82) = 0.84, p = .436, or DPES-Pride, 
F(2, 82) = 1.22, p = .302.  
There was a marginally significant main effect of participant Sex, F(1, 90) 
= 3.51, p = .065, with female participants (M = $22.22, SD = $25.37) taking more 
than males (M = $14.06, SD = $19.44). This was the case in all three emotion 
conditions; see Figure 1 for consumption results as a function of Emotion and 
Sex. 
Public Goods Dilemma Results 
 The sum of all 86 participant contributions in this game was $323.00, 
indicating an average participant contribution of $3.76. Per the game’s rules, the 
total contribution was doubled to $646, and divided equally among all 89 original 
participants, each of whom received $7.26 from the shared resource pool, in 
addition to whatever was left in their personal accounts. The amount of money 
earned ranged from $7.26 (for those participants who contributed all $5) to 
$12.26 (for those who contributed nothing).  
 Two-way Emotion x Sex interaction. A two-way ANOVA using Emotion 
and Sex as predictors was conducted to test the prediction that emotions would 
have an effect on contribution to the shared pool in the Public Goods Dilemma 
game. There was no Emotion x Sex interaction, F(2, 83) = 0.15, p = .864. The 
main effect of emotion was not significant, F(2, 83) = 0.48, p = .621. However, 
means for each emotion indicate that participants in the Neutral condition 
contributed the least amount of their $5 (M = $3.50, SD = $1.80), with Pride 
participants contributing slightly more (M = $3.65, SD = $1.36) and Guilt 
participants giving slightly more than that (M = $3.93, SD = $1.75). T-tests 
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comparing each emotion to each other emotion yielded no significant differences 
(all ps > .35).  
As in the Social Trap game, follow-up analyses were conducted to 
examine possible moderating effects of dispositional guilt and pride on the main 
effect of Emotion condition. This moderation was not significant for either DPES-
Guilt, F(2, 75) = 0.88, p = .419, or DPES-Pride, F(2, 75) = 2.00, p = .143. Neither 
DPES-Guilt (F[1, 75] = 0.44, p = .436) nor DPES-Pride (F[1, 75] = 0.01, p = .920) 
were significant as covariates. 
There was no main effect of Sex, F(1, 83) = 0.20, p = .655, although 
means indicate that Male participants contributed slightly more (M = $3.75, SD = 
$1.74) than females (M = $3.59, SD = $1.56); see Figure 2 for contribution as a 
function of Emotion condition and Sex. 
Frequencies of Individual Resource Pool Decisions 
 Of particular interest was whether individual requests in the Social Trap 
game and contributions in the Public Goods Dilemma game differed significantly 
across Emotion conditions. This test is not the same as a test of means: Rather 
than comparing exact amounts of each contribution across Emotion conditions, it 
assesses the type of contribution. Breaking the range of individual decisions into 
theoretically meaningful categories – prosocial, cooperative, and pro-self – allows 
an assessment of whether the distribution of participants across each category 
differs as a function of Emotion.   
 Social Trap request frequencies. Each participant’s decision was 
recoded into one of three categories: Under $10, indicating a generally prosocial 
choice (30.3% of participants fell into this category), Exactly $10, indicating a fair, 
cooperative choice (42.7%), or Over $10, indicating a generally pro-self choice 
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(27.0%). Interestingly, the modal category differed for each Emotion condition, 
with Under $10 being the modal choice in the Neutral condition, Exactly $10 the 
mode for Guilt, and Over $10 the mode for Pride. A chi-square test confirms that 
the distribution of decisions across these categories differs as a function of 
emotion, Χ2 (4, N = 89) = 11.22, p < .05. Also of interest is that all three 
participants who requested $100 (despite Game Feedback Sheet responses 
indicating an understanding of the rules of the game) were in the Pride condition. 
See Figure 4 for frequencies of each request category for the three Emotion 
conditions. 
Public Goods Dilemma contribution frequencies. Participants’ 
decisions were recoded into one of four categories: $0, indicating an entirely pro-
self decision (8.1% of participants fell into this category), $1-2, indicating a 
somewhat pro-self decision (14.0%), $3-4, indicating a somewhat prosocial 
decision (26.7%), and $5, indicating an entirely prosocial decision (51.2%). For 
each Emotion group, the modal contribution was $5, however, the distribution 
across categories differed. Perhaps the most interesting difference is that only in 
the Guilt condition did the majority (62.1%) contribute $5. In both other 
conditions, the majority of participants opted to contribute less than that. A 
marginally significant chi-square test confirms that the distribution of contributions 
across these four categories differs marginally significantly as a function of 
emotion, Χ2 (6, N = 86) = 12.06, p = .06. See Figure 5 for frequencies of each 
contribution category for the three Emotion conditions. 
 
Individual Differences 
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 Social Trap individual differences. Several individual difference 
measures were examined to determine how the effects of personality might affect 
consumption in this game.  
Personality subscales. For each subscale, a hierarchical linear 
regression analysis was conducted to examine the predictive power of the 
subscale over and above other subscales with which it appeared as part of a 
larger scale (e.g., for the TOSCA-Shame subscale, the five other TOSCA 
subscales were entered as Step 1, and TOSCA-Shame alone as Step 2). The 
results of these analyses are presented in Table 2. Several subscales emerged 
as significant predictors of consumption. The TOSCA-Beta Pride subscale was a 
significant positive predictor of consumption, β =.30, t(79) = 2.43, p < .05, as 
were DPES-Pride, β = .27, t(88) = 2.66, p < .01 and PSB-Self-Reported Altruism, 
β = .21, t(83) = 1.95, p < .05. The only subscale that predicted decreased 
consumption was PSB-Other Oriented Moral Reasoning, β = -.29, t(83) = -2.33, p 
< .05. The Prosocial Personality Battery-Mutual Concern Moral Reasoning 
subscale was a marginally significant positive predictor of consumption, β = .22, 
t(83) = 1.74, p < .10. 
Political orientation. Political orientation was examined in two ways: 
categorically (i.e., political party affiliation) and via a conservatism scale. There 
was no effect of political party affiliation on consumption, F(5, 88) = 0.81, p = 
.549. A test of the correlation between conservatism and consumption was not 
significant, r(90) = .00, p = .995. 
 
 
Public Goods Dilemma individual differences.  
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Personality subscales. Again, each subscale was analyzed separately 
to determine whether it significantly predicted contribution over and above the 
other subscales that were part of its larger set of scales. For this game, no 
subscale proved significant. Results are reported in Table 2. 
Political orientation. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant effect of 
categorical political affiliation on contribution, F(5, 81) = 1.13, p = .352. However, 
targeted t-tests revealed that participants who self-identified as Republicans 
donated marginally significantly more (M = $4.31, SD = $1.03) than both 
Democrats (M = $3.41, SD = $1.76), t(33) = 1.90, p = .066, and Independents (M 
= $3.43, SD = $1.90), t(39) = 1.92, p = .063. The correlation between 
conservatism and contribution was not significant, r(84) = -.02, p = .856.  
  29 
Chapter 5 
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The current research examined the effects of two self-conscious emotions 
– guilt and pride – on cooperation in two types of social dilemmas. In the first 
social dilemma task, the Social Trap game, cooperation involved exercising 
restraint in one’s consumption of a shared resource. Although participants failed 
at the game, results met the predicted pattern, with guilt leading to decreased 
consumption compared to pride, which led to increased consumption; neutral 
control was in the middle, although not significantly different from either emotion. 
These findings support the proposed hypothesis, that guilt, a prosocial emotion 
that has been conceptualized as a behavioral interruption mechanism 
(Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995), may be particularly well-suited to 
facilitating cooperation in social trap situations, by leading to decreased 
consumption. Notably, while debate exists in the guilt literature as to whether the 
beneficiary of guilt’s reparative behavior must be the target of the original guilt-
inducing act (e.g., Carlsmith & Gross, 1969; Cryder, Springer, & Morewedge, 
2012), in the current study recalling a harmful act toward a close other led to 
increased cooperation with unrelated others in a large, anonymous group. 
Because the function of guilt is to repair the relationship with the target of harm, it 
is possible that guilt would increase cooperation even more in situations in which 
cooperating directly benefits the person who had been harmed, rather than an 
unrelated group of people.  
However, an important distinction must be made between cooperation 
and prosociality. In this game, cooperation may be thought of as taking one’s fair 
share and no more, thereby ensuring that if others do the same, everyone will 
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benefit. Prosociality, as defined for the current purposes, would describe altruistic 
behavior, resulting in taking less than one’s own fair share to make sure that 
everyone else benefits. It must be noted that guilt did not necessarily lead to this 
sort of altruism; most participants in the guilt condition did not request less than 
their fair share of the resource pool. Rather, their predisposition seemed to be 
toward fairness, with approximately two-thirds of Guilt participants – twice as 
many as in either of the other conditions – claiming exactly $10. This tendency 
toward fairness over prosociality may have to do with the mismatch between 
target of harm in the guilt elicitor and target of benefit in the game, or there may 
be a different explanation. Whatever the reason, guilt appeared to motivate an 
emphasis on fairness, and this should be explored further. Prior research 
suggests that guilt may motivate cooperation and an emphasis on fairness in the 
second iteration of social bargaining games, only for those who have previously 
been uncooperative, because non-cooperators who experience the unpleasant 
feeling of guilt are motivated to avoid it in the future (Ketelaar & Au, 2003). 
Current guilt may facilitate anticipatory guilt (the expectation of experiencing guilt 
upon acting selfishly), and therefore anticipatory guilt is a potential mediator of 
the effect of guilt on consumption. Future research should examine this and other 
possible mediators of this effect.   
Unlike guilt, pride led to increased consumption in the Social Trap game, 
with the modal response being to take more than one’s fair share. This is also 
consistent with the prediction, with pride leading to the active behavior – in this 
situation, consumption from the resource pool. However, this finding could also 
be explained by the hypothesis that pride leads to a sense of entitlement. If this 
were the case, rather than facilitating a global desire to engage in action, 
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perhaps pride simply led participants to believe that they merited a larger portion 
of the pie. This competing explanation is consistent with prior research showing 
that pride is associated with an enhanced view of the self, as compared to others 
(Tracy & Robins, 2007c), and higher status often merits increased access to 
resources (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010). One way to pit these hypotheses 
against each other is in a situation like the Public Goods Dilemma, in which the 
action hypothesis would predict greater contribution, but the entitlement 
hypothesis would predict decreased contribution. Results pertaining to this 
situation are discussed below.  
Across all three Emotion conditions, females consistently requested more 
in the Social Trap game. The literature on cooperation in social dilemma games 
yields conflicting findings as to which sex is most cooperative: Females are 
sometimes found to be more cooperative, but the case may be overstated, and 
dependent upon moderating variables (e.g., Cox & Deck, 2006; Frank, Gilovich, 
& Regan, 1993; Stockard, Van de Kragt, & Dodge, 1988). The reasons for the 
current results are not clear; however, Cox and Deck (2006) demonstrated that 
females tend to be more generous when the benefits of doing so are greater 
(e.g., when others will see their prosocial behavior), and in the current study, the 
pains taken to ensure a perception of anonymity may have eliminated any female 
predisposition toward cooperation. A second explanation may stem from sex 
differences in dispositional pride. Post-hoc analyses indicate that females 
averaged higher scores than males on both TOSCA-Beta Pride (t[89] = 1.97, p = 
.051) and DPES-Pride (reported above). Both of these pride subscales 
significantly predicted higher requests, suggesting that dispositional pride may be 
the underlying factor driving consumption.  
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To assess this possibility, two meditational analyses were run (following 
the steps described by Baron & Kenny, 1986), examining TOSCA-Beta Pride and 
DPES-Pride as potential mediators of the relationship between sex and 
consumption. The necessary criteria were met for both tests (although it should 
be noted that Step 1, regressing consumption on participant sex, was only 
marginally significant; this equation is used in the calculation of both tests: β = -
8.17, t(90) = -1.74, p = .085), so the Sobel test was conducted to assess whether 
each mediation effect was significant (Sobel, 1982). The Sobel test values 
associated with mediation were marginally significant for both TOSCA-Beta Pride 
(z = -1.66, p = .097) and DPES-Pride (z = -1.76, p = .078), yielding moderate 
support for the existence of partial mediation by dispositional pride of the effect of 
sex on consumption. While these findings are consistent with the primary 
hypotheses of the study – that pride should lead to greater consumption of 
resources – more work remains to replicate these findings, and to determine 
whether dispositional pride should also predict greater or lesser contribution in a 
Public Goods Dilemma situation. 
The Public Goods Dilemma game failed to shed much light on the effects 
of guilt and pride on cooperation. In the absence of significant findings for this 
game, one can only examine trends in the results. Compared to participants in 
the Neutral and Pride conditions, Guilt participants tended to contribute slightly 
more of their shared account toward the pool, and Guilt also had the greatest 
proportion of participants (62.1%) contribute their entire $5. Had these 
differences been significant, there would be support for the hypothesis that guilt 
leads to prosocial behavior in both types of social dilemma, but the current 
findings cannot persuasively make this point.  
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Regarding the two competing hypotheses that could be used to explain 
the pride findings in the Social Trap game, ideally, the Public Goods Dilemma 
game would have helped determine which of these competing explanations was 
true. If, as originally predicted, pride led to action, then Pride participants in the 
Public Goods Dilemma game should have contributed a greater portion of their 
$5 to the shared pool, compared to Neutral and Guilt participants. In contrast, if 
pride led to a feeling of entitlement, then Pride participants in that game should 
have felt that they deserved their personal money, and should therefore have 
contributed less to the shared pool, compared to the other groups. Alas, the lack 
of any significant findings in the Public Goods Dilemma game leaves us with no 
answers. Future studies identifying the mechanism through which pride acts on 
cooperation are needed to determine how this tricky emotion can best be 
optimized in the pursuit of cooperative behavior across multiple situations. 
A primary contribution of this research is that not only does it indicate the 
benefit of considering emotions in determining the causes of cooperative 
behavior, but it also highlights the importance of considering the nature of the 
desired cooperative behavior. Whereas guilt led to increased cooperation in the 
Social Trap game, it failed to influence behavior in the Public Goods Dilemma 
game. Similarly, pride’s negative influence on cooperation was found only in the 
Social Trap game. This inconsistency across situations could derive from two 
possible explanations: Either both of these emotions fail to influence behavior in 
a Public Goods Dilemma, or the Public Goods Dilemma game was not designed 
well enough to detect the effect of these emotions.  
Assuming the Public Goods Dilemma game was well designed, there may 
exist psychological reasons for why the guilt and pride manipulations did not 
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have an effect on contributions. One potential issue is that the nature of a public 
goods dilemma requires that people give something up (therefore it is framed as 
a loss), distinguishing it from social traps, in which people stand to gain. Humans 
are more attuned to and influenced by loss than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), and therefore it may take a greater emotional motivation to move behavior 
in the public goods dilemma than in the social trap, especially since both guilt 
and pride were predicted to increase contributions (thereby increasing perceived 
loss). It is possible that the emotion elicitors, which were consistent across 
studies, were strong enough to influence gain-seeking behavior in the Social 
Trap game, but not strong enough to influence loss-risking behavior in the Public 
Goods Dilemma game. Multiple options exist for addressing this possibility, 
including using stronger emotion manipulations, examining dispositional gain-
seeking and loss-aversion as mediators, and finding creative ways to frame the 
Public Goods Dilemma game so that the loss is not so salient. 
The original prediction for guilt was that it would increase contribution 
compared to the Neutral and Pride conditions, but it was also thought that this 
effect would not be as strong as guilt’s effect on consumption in the Social Trap 
game. The rationale behind this prediction derives from Baumeister and 
colleagues’ description of guilt as a “behavioral interrupt” mechanism that causes 
people to assess their current harmful behavior and put an end to it. In the case 
of the Public Goods Dilemma game, in which the desired behavior is increased 
contribution, the action-reducing effects of guilt simply may not be the most 
effective emotional intervention for this type of social dilemma. In other words, if 
guilt simultaneously results in both prosociality and behavioral cessation, these 
effects – which work in conjunction to reduce consumption in the social trap 
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situation – would oppose each other in the public goods dilemma. An emotion 
that facilitates action and risk-taking, such as anger (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 
2009; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), may be a more appropriate choice to increase 
contribution, although the framing of this emotional appeal would have to be 
carefully designed to avoid the possible counterproductive effects (e.g., because 
anger is proposed to facilitate accomplishment of one’s own thwarted goals, it is 
equally reasonable to assume that anger would result in self-serving decisions, in 
this case feeling “owed” by others and retaining one’s own resources).  
A secondary explanation for guilt’s lack of influence on contribution may 
stem from the lack of a true measure of “fairness” in this game. Given that guilt 
seemed to predispose participants toward fairness in the Social Trap game, 
rather than altruism or self-punishment, we might expect to find a similar 
predisposition in the Public Goods Dilemma game. However, the Social Trap 
game had a very clear “fair share,” and it was probably obvious to most 
participants what the “right” or “fair” amount of consumption should be. In 
contrast, participants may not have been sure what constituted a fair contribution 
in the Public Goods Dilemma game – contributing all of one’s own money? Most? 
Half? It is unsurprising that guilt’s effect on fairness is not clear, if participants are 
unsure of what constitutes “fair” in the first place. 
Pride’s lack of influence on contribution may result from conflicting goals. 
In the Social Trap game, the increased consumption by Pride participants could 
support either the action hypothesis or the entitlement hypothesis, and it is 
possible that both are right. It is not uncommon for a single emotion to elicit 
multiple behaviors with the purpose of achieving multiple goals, which may 
sometimes fall in conflict with each other. For example, guilt has been proposed 
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to facilitate both prosociality and self-punishment (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009), 
but these goals may conflict with each other if prosociality also benefits the self, 
or if self-punishment also harms the other. In the case of our Public Goods 
Dilemma game, it is therefore possible that both action and entitlement goals 
were activated in individual participants, opposing each other so that the overall 
effect of pride disappeared completely. It is equally possible that pride, mediated 
or moderated by some personality variable, acted primarily as an action-facilitator 
in some participants and primarily as an entitlement-enhancer in others. In this 
case, the overall effect of pride across the group would have averaged out and 
appeared to have no effect at all.  
In retrospect, it is also possible that the design of the Public Goods 
Dilemma game may not have allowed for enough variability in the dependent 
variable for detection of significant differences between the groups. Unlike the 
Social Trap game, in which a participant’s possible choices ranged from $0-
$1,000, a Public Goods Dilemma participant could only contribute anywhere from 
$0-$5. Only two participants contributed partial dollars (in other words, almost all 
rounded their donations to full dollars), so there were essentially only six 
response options: $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, or $5. A quick examination of responses 
reveals that the majority of participants (51.2%) contributed all $5 from their 
accounts, possibly because $5 is a small enough amount that it was worth risking 
for the greater good. Had each individual started with a larger personal account – 
for example, $10 or $20 – parting with the full amount may have felt like more of 
a loss, and worthy of greater consideration, thereby perhaps leading to a wider 
range of contributions. Maximizing variance in the dependent variable in this way 
  37 
could very well increase statistical power such that existing differences between 
the groups become significant.  
Perhaps the most interesting findings to come of this research are the 
ones that were wholly unexpected: insights into the reasons for common poor 
performance at the Social Trap game. Prior literature on this type of game has 
often noted the surprising frequency with which participants fail to optimize their 
outcomes, or to win anything at all (e.g., Brechner, 1977; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & 
Magee, 2003). However, these failures are often discussed in terms of such 
psychological phenomena as reinforcement schedules, expected values, and 
group size. Although researchers have identified the importance of it, there is 
little research examining game comprehension and thought patterns for each 
individual (Cárdenas & Ostrom, 2004). The addition of the Game Feedback 
Sheet, originally intended only to allow elimination from analyses of those 
participants who failed to understand the game, ended up yielding remarkable 
participant feedback.  
Of the 105 participants who played the Social Trap game, fourteen were 
removed from analyses. Three were removed due to a lack of understanding of 
the game, suggesting that even when the rules of a shared resource game are 
laid out as clearly as possible, some people simply fail to understand the realities 
of the situation or the impact of individual behaviors on the outcome of the group. 
This previously unexamined deficiency may actually be a crucial driver of the 
prevalent failures to maximize individual and group outcomes in these situations, 
both experimental and real-world. A second surprising finding was that even 
among those participants who understood the rules of the game, seven were 
unable to perform the basic math required to calculate their own share, and in all 
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cases, this led to overconsumption by a factor of 10. This finding was wholly 
unexpected, but has important implications: If people have difficulty determining 
their own fair share when the basic mathematical equation is laid out for them, 
how can they be expected to estimate their own share when the situation is as 
complex and intangible as most social traps appear to be? An examination of the 
amounts requested by these seven participants (generally $90 or $100, 
translating to $9 or $10 if they had performed the math correctly) indicates that 
they were trying to cooperate. For the purposes of this study, I explicitly avoided 
telling participants that their fair share was $10, so that they did not anchor onto 
that amount. However, these results highlight the importance of making it clear to 
people what their piece of the pie truly is, to avoid basic errors like the ones seen 
here.  
After the removal of all participants who did not meet the game’s basic 
requirements, the 91 participants who understood the game and performed the 
math correctly still requested $1,605.83, an average of $17.65/person, and failed 
to cooperate well enough to meet the goal. All Emotion groups averaged 
requests higher than $10, indicating that even the most cooperative group, Guilt, 
could not have won the game. While these results are not uncommon, it 
suggests that even this study’s best attempts at motivating cooperation are not 
enough. If guilt truly does facilitate cooperation or fairness, a successful guilt 
elicitation method must be stronger than the one used here.   
The current study was designed to have an important strength: 
Participants were put in a situation in which real money was on the line, and 
therefore their decisions reflect meaningful behaviors. However, the study also 
involved some limitations and weaknesses. One limitation involves the game’s 
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timeline. Due to the necessity of knowing everyone’s decisions before calculating 
individual outcomes and doling out winnings, the study design required a time 
delay of several weeks between participation and earnings. Participants were 
aware of this time lag before making their decisions, and a couple even 
commented that the relatively paltry potential earnings were not enough to 
warrant returning later to pick them up. On the positive side, this time lag 
increased the ecological validity of the study, because real-life resource 
management dilemmas often necessitate making decisions in the present with 
outcomes for the future. However, it is unknown whether the knowledge of this 
time delay affected participants’ consumption or contribution decisions in any 
meaningful way, and so future studies may attempt to address this issue by 
shortening or eliminating the time delay, or at the very least by adding questions 
that probe into this potential issue in the Game Feedback Sheet. 
A second important limitation of the current research is that only two 
emotions were examined, and these were of opposite valence (guilt being 
generally considered a negative emotion, and pride a positive one). Therefore, 
although the Social Trap results support the proposed hypothesis that guilt acts 
as a behavioral stop mechanism to reduce consumption, and pride acts to 
increase action, the lack of other negative or positive emotions means a valence-
based explanation cannot definitively be ruled out. In most valence-driven 
research, experimenters elicit one negative emotion and one positive emotion, 
then assess the effect of each on some outcome of interest, with the goal of 
showing that negative and positive affect have opposite effects on this outcome. 
It could be argued that this is what was done in the current study. However, a 
valence-based explanation is not consistent with our results. Valence research 
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suggests that those in a good mood should prioritize loss aversion, in an attempt 
to preserve the current mood, whereas those in a bad mood should prioritize gain 
seeking, in an attempt to improve mood (Cohen, Pham, & Andrade, 2007; Keller, 
Lipkus, & Rimer, 2003). In the context of the current study, therefore, a valence 
approach would predict that in the Social Trap game (in which participants only 
stand to gain), negative mood (in this case, guilt) should lead to greater gain-
seeking than positive mood (pride), which was not the case. In contrast, in the 
Public Goods Dilemma game (in which participants stand to lose existing 
resources), positive mood (pride) should lead to lower contribution than negative 
mood (guilt); this result also failed to occur. Therefore, the current results cannot 
be satisfactorily explained by a valence approach.  
That said, the only reliable way to rule out a valence-based explanation is 
to examine other negative and positive emotions. Whereas a valence approach 
would suggest that all positive emotions should act the same, and all negative 
emotions should act the same (but different from positive), an evolutionary 
approach would pit two same-valenced emotions against each other and show 
that they have opposite effects on cooperation, consistent with their proposed 
functions, and via different mechanisms. To do this in the Social Trap game, for 
example, one might begin with pride versus nurturant love. Nurturant love, a 
positive emotion that has been proposed to facilitate care taking of others 
(Shaver, Morgan, & Wu, 1996), may involve increased cooperation and 
prosociality, as maximizing outcomes to the self is not the central focus of 
concern. Nurturant love has also been shown to increase systematic processing 
(Griskevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld, 2010), which may cause participants to more 
critically evaluate the situation and realize that by taking more than $10, they 
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jeopardize their opportunity to win anything at all. Therefore, we might expect 
that nurturant love could lead to more restrained consumption, whereas pride 
should again lead to increased consumption. As for the negative emotions, 
whereas guilt led to decreased consumption, an emotion such as anger (which is 
associated with increased action and approach; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009) 
may lead to increased consumption in an attempt to “right the wrong” that the 
participant may feel he or she has endured. A thorough examination of multiple 
negative and positive emotions would contribute greatly to this line of research, 
not only for the purpose of ruling out a valence-based explanation of the current 
findings, but as a way of shedding greater light on the effects each emotion might 
have on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. 
A third limitation of the current study derives from the use of college 
undergraduates as a convenience sample of participants. This group differs 
markedly in several ways from the general public, including age, education level, 
and ethnicity. While these differences may call to question the external validity of 
these findings, there is no obvious reason why guilt and pride would cause 
significantly different cooperative reactions in other populations. It is possible that 
there would be cultural differences, with members of collectivist cultures 
performing more cooperatively overall due to their emphasis on enhancing group 
interests (Wagner, 1995). Particularly, as collectivists are less responsive to 
personal pride (Stipek, 1998), the intrapersonal pride manipulation used in the 
current studies may not have as strong an effect on them. As in any research, 
replication of findings in groups that vary in age, ethnicity, and education are 
necessary to demonstrate the robustness of the proposed effect. 
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Failure to maximize outcomes – or indeed, to receive any outcome at all – 
is common in these games, and unfortunately, the mechanisms driving this 
failure are contributing to serious real-world resource management dilemmas. 
Lacking in the literature, however, is a thorough analysis of why people tend to 
perform so poorly. Researchers generally discuss their results in terms of whole-
group failure due to issues of behavioral economics or group dynamics, but the 
current research highlights the importance of identifying individual-level 
predictors of cooperation, such as state and trait emotional experience, and 
game comprehension. Ultimately, the more we learn about why participants 
behave the way they do and how cooperation can be improved in laboratory 
settings, the greater our hopes for maximizing cooperation and maintaining 
shared resources in the modern world. 
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1. Participants read and complete Cover Letter (Appendix B) 
2. Recalled Emotion Manipulation (Appendix C) 
a. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of three conditions.   
b. This is a between-subjects manipulation. 
3. Social Dilemma Game (Appendices D and E)                                           
a. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of two conditions. 
b. This is a between-subjects manipulation.  
4. Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3) (Appendix F) 
5. Environmental Attitudes Inventory (EAI)-Personal Conservation Behavior 
(Appendix G) 
6. Prosocial Personality Battery (PSB) (Appendix H) 
7. Dispositional Positive Emotion Scale (DPES) (Appendix I) 
8. Game Feedback Sheet (Appendix J) 
9. Emotion Manipulation Check (Appendix K) 
10. Demographic Information (Appendix L) 
11. Participant Debrief (Appendix M) 
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STUDY TITLE: Recalled Experiences 
 
10/5/2011 
 
Dear Participant: 
 
I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Michelle N. Shiota in the 
Department of Psychology at Arizona State University. I am conducting a 
research study to investigate the ways in which people behave in certain 
situations. I am inviting your participation, which will involve approximately 1 hour 
of your time. In this study, you will be asked to complete three separate tasks 
(this hour is three studies in one). Participants have to be 18 years old or older to 
participate. 
 
In the first task, you will recall and write about a time when you experienced a 
certain type of situation. In the second task, you will play a game in which you 
must make a decision about how to manage a shared resource. In this game, 
you will have the opportunity to make some money, but please note that your 
outcome depends on the decisions of everyone else in the study. For that 
reason, if you win the money, you will receive it at the end of the semester, once 
the study is complete. In the third task, you will complete a series of 
questionnaires. 
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You can skip questions if you wish. If 
you choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time, there will 
be no penalty. For example, it will not affect your grade in your PGS 101 class.  
 
You will receive one research participation credit for participating in this study, 
and the results of this research study may be used in reports, presentations, and 
publications. Your name will not be associated with your responses. There are no 
foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation. Return of the 
questionnaires will be considered your consent to participate. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact Samantha 
Neufeld at 949-842-3497 (Samantha.neufeld@asu.edu) or Michelle N. Shiota at 
480-727-8628 (lani.shiota@asu.edu). If you have any questions about your rights 
as a participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you 
can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, through 
the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. 
 
Thank you for your assistance in this research, 
 
Samantha Neufeld 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
So that we can contact you regarding your possible earnings at the end of this 
study, please enter the information below. Note: This information will NOT be 
shared with anyone outside of this research laboratory, and will be used solely 
for the purpose of contacting you to inform you of the results of the game. The 
information you provide will be strictly confidential. 
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1. Name _____________________________________________________ 
2. Phone number ______________________________________________ 
3. Email _____________________________________________________ 
4. Student ID _________________________________________________
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**Verbal Instructions: “For the first task, a relived experience task, we are 
interested in how people remember different kinds of situations. When I tell you 
to start, please read the instructions at the top of the page. You will be asked to 
relive and experience, and write about it in as much detail as possible. This is a 
relived experience task, meaning we want you to remember and think about the 
experience for a bit before you begin writing. Once you have spent some time 
remembering the experience, you will be given five minutes to write about it in as 
much detail as possible. If you finish early, please close your eyes and continue 
thinking about that experience. Do not move on to the next study yet, I will 
instruct you as to when we will move on.” 
 
**Participants will be given the instructions in writing (below), as well as a lined 
sheet of paper on which to write their response. 
 
Neutral: Please think about a recent time (within the past year) when you did 
your laundry. Please recall a specific event when you did the laundry, rather than 
a general period of time. Please reflect on this incident for a few moments, and 
try to remember all that you can about the circumstances surrounding it. Please 
be honest – this study is completely confidential. Do not include your own name 
or the name of anyone else in your response. Now please describe the situation, 
in as much detail as possible. You will have five minutes to write. If you finish 
early, please close your eyes and continue reliving that experience. DO NOT 
MOVE ON TO THE NEXT TASK. 
 
Guilt: Please think about a recent time (within the past year) when you harmed or 
betrayed someone close to you. This could have been intentional or 
unintentional. Please recall a specific event when you harmed or betrayed 
someone close to you, rather than a general period of time. Please reflect on this 
incident for a few moments, and try to remember all that you can about the 
circumstances surrounding it. Please be honest – this study is completely 
confidential. Do not include your own name or the name of anyone else in your 
response. Now please describe the situation, in as much detail as possible. You 
will have five minutes to write. If you finish early, please close your eyes and 
continue reliving that experience. DO NOT MOVE ON TO THE NEXT TASK. 
 
Pride: Please think about a recent time (within the past year) when you 
accomplished something important to you. This might include an academic 
achievement, an extra-curricular achievement, or some other time when you did 
something really well. Please recall a specific event when you achieved 
something important to you, rather than a general period of time. Please reflect 
on this incident for a few moments, and try to remember all that you can about 
the circumstances surrounding it. Please be honest – this study is completely 
confidential. Do not include your own name or the name of anyone else in your 
response. Now please describe the situation, in as much detail as possible. You 
will have five minutes to write. If you finish early, please close your eyes and 
continue reliving that experience. DO NOT MOVE ON TO THE NEXT TASK. 
 
Please describe the situation, with as much detail as possible:  
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APPENDIX D  
SOCIAL TRAP GAME 
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(Adapted from Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003) 
 
Instructions delivered verbally and in writing. 
There are many resources of a fixed amount, such as fossil fuels like gasoline, 
that are available to everyone and whose existence depends on people not 
consuming too much. If enough people are reasonable about how much they 
consume, these resources will continue to be available. If enough people 
consume too much, however, they will cease to exist. In this case, the less each 
person consumes, the more there is for everyone. But it is also possible that 
people could take so much that there would be none left for anyone, including 
you. Thus, each person must decide whether to take from the resource at all, and 
if so, how much to take.  
 
Today you will participate in a game that puts you in a situation like the one 
described above. You and 99 other participants in this study share access to a 
common pool of $1,000 dollars. You are free to ask for as much money from that 
pool as you like. But you should also be careful not to ask for too much, because 
if at the end of the study everyone’s requests add up to more than the 
$1,000 that is in the pool, then nobody, including yourself, will receive 
anything. In other words, if the sum total of all 100 requests adds up to more 
than $1,000, no one gets any money. 
 
Please read the following examples: 
 
Example A) If everyone’s requests added together add up to $900, every person 
gets the amount that they asked for, including you. 
 
Example B) If everyone’s requests added together add up to $1,100, no person 
gets anything, including you.  
 
This study will be run until the end of the semester, at which point the 
experimenter will tally everyone’s decisions. The researcher will be the only one 
to see your decision. If the 100 people have asked for a total of $1,000 or less, 
then everyone will receive the amount they requested. However, if the 100 
people have asked for a total of more than $1,000, no one will receive anything. 
You will be notified of the game results via email at the end of the semester, and 
if you have earned money, it will be available for pick-up in the Shiota Lab in the 
Psychology North building on this campus. 
 
Please decide now: How much money would you like to take from the pool?  
 
$ _________ 
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PUBLIC GOODS DILEMMA GAME 
  
 57 
Instructions delivered verbally and in writing. 
There are many public services and resources, such as public radio stations, that 
are available to everyone but whose existence depends upon voluntary 
contributions. If people contribute enough money, these resources will continue 
to be available to everyone. If voluntary contributions fall below a certain point, 
however, they will be under-supported and cease to exist. The more people are 
willing to contribute, the better these shared resources will be. It is possible to 
contribute nothing and still enjoy the resource, since access is open to all. On the 
other hand, if people do not contribute enough the resource cannot be sustained, 
and no one will enjoy access to it. Thus, each person must decide whether to 
contribute to the resource and, if so, how much to contribute.  
 
Today you will participate in a game that puts you in a situation like the one 
described above. You and 99 other participants in this study will each be given a 
starting “personal bank account” of $5. At the current time, the resource pool 
stands at $0. All 100 participants, including you, will be given the opportunity to 
contribute anywhere from $0-$5 to the pool, and once everyone has decided how 
much to contribute, the pool will be doubled and divided equally among all 100 
people. You will also get to keep what is remaining in your personal bank 
account. In other words, the more each person contributes, the larger the 
resource pool will become, and once it is doubled, it will be even larger. The pool 
will then be shared equally by everyone, regardless of how much any individual 
contributed, on top of what is left in their personal accounts. You are free to 
contribute as much or as little of your $5 as you like, and at the end of the study, 
you will receive whatever is left in your personal account, plus 1/100th of the 
resource pool.  
 
Example A) If everyone across the entire participant group gives a collective total 
of $200, that is doubled to $400, and everyone in the study (including you) 
receives $4 plus whatever they kept in their bank account. 
 
Example B) If everyone across the entire participant group gives a collective total 
of $400, that is doubled to $800, and everyone in the study (including you) 
receives $8 plus whatever they kept in their bank account. 
 
This study will be run until the end of the semester, at which point the 
experimenter will tally everyone’s decisions. The researcher will be the only one 
to see your decision. You will be notified of the game results via email at the end 
of the semester, and if you have earned money, it will be available for pick-up in 
the Shiota Lab in the Psychology North building on this campus. 
 
Please decide now: How much money (from $0-$5) would you like to contribute 
to the resource pool?  
 
 
$ _________ 
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APPENDIX F  
TEST OF SELF-CONSCIOUS AFFECT-3 
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(Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000) 
 
Below are situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, 
followed by several common reactions to those situations. As you read each 
scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation.  Then indicate how likely you 
would be to react in each of the ways described.  We ask you to rate all 
responses because people may feel or react more than one way to the same 
situation, or they may react different ways at different times.   
 
For example: 
A.  You wake up early one Saturday morning.  It is cold and rainy outside. 
    a) You would telephone a friend to catch up on news. 
    b) You would take the extra time to read the paper.  
   c) You would feel disappointed that it’s raining.                                                      
    d) You would wonder why you woke up so early.            
                                                              
In the above example, I've rated ALL of the answers by circling a number.  I 
circled a "1" for answer (a) because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early 
on a Saturday morning -- so it's not at all likely that I would do that.  I circled a "5" 
for answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in the 
morning ().  I circled a "3" for answer (c) because for me it's about half and half.  
Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't -- it 
would depend on what I had planned.  And I circled a "4" for answer (d) because 
I would probably wonder why I had awakened so early.  
 
    Please do not skip any items -- rate all responses.  
  
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch.  At 5 o'clock, you realize you stood 
him up. 
a) You would think: "I'm inconsiderate."                 
b) You would think: "Well, they'll understand."          
c) You'd think you should make it up to him as soon as possible.                                           
    d) You would think: "My boss distracted me just before lunch."                                          
 
2. You break something at work and then hide it. 
a) You would think: "This is making me anxious.  I need to either fix it or 
get someone else to."          
    b) You would think about quitting.                       
c) You would think: "A lot of things aren't made very well these days."                                  
d) You would think: "It was only an accident."           
 
3. You are out with friends one evening, and you're feeling especially witty and 
attractive.  Your best friend's spouse seems to particularly enjoy your company. 
a) You would think: "I should have been aware of what my best friend is 
feeling."                             
b) You would feel happy with your appearance and personality.                                           
    c) You would feel pleased to have made such a good impression.                                             
d) You would think your best friend should pay attention to his/her 
spouse.                           
e) You would probably avoid eye-contact for a long time.                                                    
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 4. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly. 
    a) You would feel incompetent.                           
b) You would think: "There are never enough hours in the day."                                            
c) You would feel: "I deserve to be reprimanded for mismanaging the 
project."                               
d) You would think: "What's done is done."               
 
5. You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for the error. 
a) You would think the company did not like the co-worker.                                             
b) You would think: "Life is not fair."                  
c) You would keep quiet and avoid the co-worker.         
d) You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation.                                              
 
6. For several days you put off making a difficult phone call.  At the last minute 
you make the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes 
well. 
a) You would think: "I guess I'm more persuasive than I thought."                                             
    b) You would regret that you put it off.                 
    c) You would feel like a coward.                         
d) You would think: "I did a good job."                  
e) You would think you shouldn't have to make calls you feel pressured 
into.                                 
 
7. While playing around, you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face. 
a) You would feel inadequate that you can't even throw a ball.                                           
    b) You would think maybe your friend needs more practice at catching.                                   
    c) You would think: "It was just an accident."           
    d) You would apologize and make sure your friend feels better.                                           
 
8. You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very 
helpful.  A few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as soon 
as you could. 
a) You would feel immature.                              
    b) You would think: "I sure ran into some bad luck."     
    c) You would return the favor as quickly as you could.   
    d) You would think: "I am a trustworthy person."         
    e) You would be proud that you repaid your debts.        
                                                             
9. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal. 
    a) You would think the animal shouldn't have been on the road.                                            
   b) You would think: "I'm terrible."                      
    c) You would feel: "Well, it was an accident."           
    d) You'd feel bad you hadn't been more alert driving down the road.                                  
 
10. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well.  Then you find out 
you did poorly. 
    a) You would think: "Well, it's just a test."            
    b) You would think: "The instructor doesn't like me."    
    c) You would think: "I should have studied harder."      
    d) You would feel stupid.                                
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11. You and a group of co-workers worked very hard on a project.  Your boss 
singles you out for a bonus because the project was such a success. 
    a) You would feel the boss is rather short-sighted.      
b) You would feel alone and apart from your colleagues.                                             
    c) You would feel your hard work had paid off.           
    d) You would feel competent and proud of yourself.       
    e) You would feel you should not accept it.              
 
12. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who's not there. 
a) You would think: "It was all in fun; it's harmless."  
    b) You would feel small...like a rat.                    
c) You would think that perhaps that friend should have been there to 
defend himself/herself.              
d) You would apologize and talk about that person's good points.                                           
 
13. You make a big mistake on an important project at work.  People were 
depending on you, and your boss criticizes you. 
a) You would think your boss should have been more clear about what 
was expected of you.                   
b) You would feel like you wanted to hide.               
c) You would think: "I should have recognized the problem and done a 
better job."                        
d) You would think: "Well, nobody's perfect."            
 
14. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped 
children.  It turns out to be frustrating and time-consuming work.  You think 
seriously about quitting, but then you see how happy the kids are. 
a) You would feel selfish and you'd think you are basically lazy.                                         
b) You would feel you were forced into doing something you did not want 
to do.                       
c) You would think: "I should be more concerned about people who are 
less fortunate."                      
    d) You would feel great that you had helped others.      
e) You would feel very satisfied with yourself.          
 
15. You are taking care of your friend's dog while they are on vacation and the 
dog runs away. 
    a) You would think, "I am irresponsible and incompetent.”                                           
b) You would think your friend must not take very good care of their dog 
or it wouldn't have run away. 
    c) You would vow to be more careful next time.           
d) You would think your friend could just get a new dog.                                                
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16. You attend your co-worker's housewarming party and you spill red wine on 
their new cream-colored carpet, but you think no one notices. 
a) You think your co-worker should have expected some accidents at 
such a big party.                     
    b) You would stay late to help clean up the stain after the party.                                        
    c) You would wish you were anywhere but at the party.                                             
d) You would wonder why your co-worker chose to serve red wine with 
the new light carpet.               
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APPENDIX G 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES INVENTORY, SUBSCALE 8: PERSONAL 
CONSERVATION BEHAVIOR 
  
 64 
(Milfont & Duckitt, 2010) 
 
The following questions are answered on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
 
1. I could not be bothered to save water or other natural resources.(R) 
2. I make sure that during the winter the heating system in my room is not 
switched on too high. 
3. In my daily life I’m just not interested in trying to conserve water and/or power. 
(R) 
4. Whenever possible, I take a short shower in order to conserve water. 
5. I always switch the light off when I don’t need it on any more. 
6. I drive whenever it suits me, even if it does pollute the atmosphere. (R) 
7. In my daily life I try to find ways to conserve water or power 
8. I am NOT the kind of person who makes efforts to conserve natural resources. 
(R) 
9. Whenever possible, I try to save natural resources. 
10. Even if public transportation was more efficient than it is, I would prefer to 
drive my car. (R) 
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APPENDIX H  
PROSOCIAL PERSONALITY BATTERY 
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(Penner, 2002) 
 
PART 1: Below are a number of statements that may or may not describe you, 
your feelings, or your behavior. Please read each statement carefully and 
blacken in the space on your answer sheet that corresponds to choices 
presented below. There are no right or wrong responses. 
 
1: STRONGLY DISAGREE 
2: DISAGREE 
3: UNCERTAIN 
4: AGREE 
5: STRONGLY AGREE 
 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
1. When people are nasty to me, I feel very little responsibility to treat them well. 
(R) 
2. I would feel less bothered about leaving litter in a dirty park than in a clean 
one. (R)  
3. No matter what a person has done to us, there is no excuse for taking 
advantage of them. 
4. With the pressure for grades and the widespread cheating in school 
nowadays, the individual who cheats occasionally is not really as much at fault. 
(R) 
5. It doesn't make much sense to be very concerned about how we act when we 
are sick and feeling miserable. (R)  
6. If I broke a machine through mishandling, I would feel less guilty if it was 
already damaged before I used it. (R) 7. When you have a job to do, it is 
impossible to look out for everybody's best interest. (R) 
 
EMPATHY SCALE  
8. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other person's" point of view. 
PT (R) 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective 
towards them. EC  
10. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look 
from their perspective. PT  
11. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. EC (R)  
12. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to 
other people's arguments. PT (R)  
13. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much 
pity for them. EC (R)  
14. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. PD (R)  
15. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. EC  
16. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at 
them both. PT  
17. I tend to lose control during emergencies. PD  
18. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in their shoes" for a 
while. PT  
19. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. 
PD 
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PART 2: 
Below is a set of statements, which may or may not describe how you make 
decisions when you have to choose between two courses of action or 
alternatives when there is no clear right way or wrong way to act. Some 
examples of such situations are: being asked to lend something to a close friend 
who often forgets to return things; deciding whether you should keep something 
you have won for yourself or share it with a friend; and choosing between 
studying for an important exam and visiting a sick relative. Read each statement 
and blacken in the space on your answer sheet that corresponds to the choices 
presented below. 
 
1: STRONGLY DISAGREE 
2: DISAGREE 
3: UNCERTAIN 
4: AGREE 
5: STRONGLY AGREE 
 
MORAL REASONING  
20. My decisions are usually based on my concern for other people. O 
21. My decisions are usually based on what is the most fair and just way to act. 
M  
22. I choose alternatives that are intended to meet everybody's needs. M  
23. I choose a course of action that maximizes the help other people receive. O  
24. I choose a course of action that considers the rights of all people involved. M  
25. My decisions are usually based on concern for the welfare of others. O 
 
Below are several different actions in which people sometimes engage. Read 
each of them and decide how frequently you have carried it out in the past. 
Blacken in the space on your answer sheet which best describes your past 
behavior. Use the scale presented below.  
 
1: NEVER 
2: ONCE 
3: MORE THAN ONCE 
4: OFTEN 
5: VERY OFTEN 
 
SELF-REPORTED ALTRUISM  
26. I have helped carry a stranger's belongings (e.g., books, parcels, etc.). 
27. I have allowed someone to go ahead of me in a line (e.g., supermarket, 
copying machine, etc.)  
28. I have let a neighbor whom I didn't know too well borrow an item of some 
value (e.g., tools, a dish, etc.).  
29. I have, before being asked, voluntarily looked after a neighbor's pets or 
children without being paid for it.  
30. I have offered to help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street. 
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Scoring Instructions:  
Reverse Items with an R  
Compute scores for 7 individual scales: Social Responsibility (SR) Empathic 
Concern (EC) Perspective Taking (PT) Personal Distress (PD) Other-Oriented 
Moral Reasoning (O) Mutual Concerns moral reasoning (M) Self-reported 
altruism (SRA) 
 
Factor 1, Other-oriented empathy, = sum of scores on SR, EC, PT, O, M. 
Factor 2, Helpfulness, = sum of PD (total reversed*) and SRA. 
 
*After you have reversed the one PD item with an “R” after it, sum the PD items 
and subtract the total score on PD from 18. This makes the meaning of a high 
score on the Helpfulness factor clearer, because now high scores on the two 
scales both represent prosocial tendencies. 
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APPENDIX I  
DISPOSITIONAL POSITIVE EMOTION SCALE – PRIDE, GUILT 
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(Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006) 
**Along with this subscale, we created a corresponding set of Guilt questions 
 
Each item below contains a statement about your feelings. Think about each 
statement separately, and decide how much you agree with it. There are no right 
or wrong answers. For each statement, fill in the bubble on the left for the 
number from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) that best represents your 
feelings. 
 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
 O  O  O  O  O  O  O  I take great pride in my achievements. 
 O  O  O  O  O  O  O  It feels good to know that people look up to me. 
 O  O  O  O  O  O  O  I really enjoy the feeling of accomplishment. 
 O  O  O  O  O  O  O I feel strong positive emotion when I do something 
well. 
 
 O  O  O  O  O  O  O  I feel remorse for the ways that I’ve harmed others. 
 O  O  O  O  O  O  O It really upsets me when I do something that hurts 
another person. 
 O  O  O  O  O  O  O  I often feel guilty for things I’ve done. 
 O  O  O  O  O  O  O I feel strong negative emotion when I’ve done 
something wrong. 
 
 
  
 71 
APPENDIX J  
GAME FEEDBACK SHEET 
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RESOURCE GAME INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
Please think back to the resource allocation game you played in Study 2. In as 
much detail as possible, please describe the rules of that game (for example, 
what was the situation you were in, how does your individual outcome depend on 
everyone else’s decisions, how does everyone else’s outcome depend on your 
decision, and what do you think is the best strategy for success in this game)? 
 
What was the situation? 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
How does your outcome as an individual depend on the decisions made by 
everyone else in the study? 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
How do everyone else’s outcomes depend on the decision that you make? 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
What do you think is the best strategy for success in this game? 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Do you have any other thoughts about the game? 
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________ 
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EMOTION MANIPULATION CHECK 
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Please think back to the very first task you completed, in which you wrote about a 
personal experience. We are interested in knowing what emotions you might 
have felt while writing about your experience. Please indicate how strongly you 
felt each emotion while you were writing about your experience and imagining 
yourself in that situation (0 = none at all; 8 = strongest experience of this emotion 
I’ve ever felt). 
 
 None at All      Strongest Ever 
 
1. Amusement 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2. Anger  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
3. Awe  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4. Disgust 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
5. Embarrassment 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
6. Enthusiasm 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
7. Fear  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
8. Guilt  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
9. Happiness 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
10. Love  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
11. Pride  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
12. Sadness  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
13. Shame  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
14. Tenderness/Compassion   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
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1. Sex  
 
2. Age 
 
3. Religion:  
1.  Atheist/Agnostic (uncertain);  
2.  Catholic or Greek Orthodox;  
3.  Non-Catholic Christian;  
4.  LDS/Mormon;  
5.  Hindu;  
6.  Buddhist;  
7.  Jewish;  
8.  Muslim;  
9.  Native American 
10.  Other 
 
4. Please rate how RELIGIOUS you are on a scale from 1-7 (1 = not at all religious, 7 
= extremely religious) 
 
5. Please rate how SPIRITUAL you are on a scale from 1-7 (1 = not at all spiritual, 7 = 
extremely spiritual) 
 
6. Ethnicity:  
1.  White/Caucasian;  
2.  Black/African-American;  
3.  Hispanic/Latino;  
4.  Native American;  
5.  East Asian (ex: China, Japan);  
6.  South Asian (ex: India);  
7.  Southeast Asian (ex: Indonesia);  
8.  Asian-American;  
9.  Middle Eastern; 
10.  Arab/Arab-American 
11.  Other  
 
7. Political party: 
1. Democrat 
2. Republican 
3. Libertarian 
4. Green 
5. Independent 
6. Other 
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Political Attitudes: Rate your political views on a scale from 1 (Very liberal) to 7 
(very conservative). 4 is moderate.  
 
1. How liberal or conservative are you in terms of social issues? 
o 1 Extremely Conservative 
o 7 Extremely Liberal 
2. How liberal or conservative are you in terms of fiscal issues? 
o 1 Extremely Conservative 
o 7 Extremely Liberal 
3. How liberal or conservative are you, overall? 
o 1 Extremely Conservative 
o 7 Extremely Liberal 
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APPENDIX M  
PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF 
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Recalled Experiences Study 
 
Thank you for your participation in this study. In this study, we elicited pride 
and guilt, and then had you play a resource management game. The purpose 
of our research is to better understand the nature of social dilemmas, and the 
effects of emotions, such as guilt and pride, on people’s decisions in resource 
management games.   
 
Many resource management issues fall into the category of "social dilemmas": 
situations in which an individual benefits by being selfish (by either consuming 
too much of a shared resource, or not contributing enough to a shared 
resource), and in which large-scale individual selfishness leads to long-term 
negative consequences to the group. Psychologists have identified a number 
of mechanisms through which social dilemmas can be mitigated, for example, 
by giving people immediate feedback on the consequences of their actions, or 
emphasizing social norms that encourage cooperation. One psychological 
phenomenon that has been understudied in terms of social dilemmas is 
emotion. In particular, there is strong theoretical support for the notion that the 
self-conscious emotions guilt and pride should increase cooperation in 
resource management games. In this line of research, I am examining the 
effects of guilt and pride on cooperation and defection in social dilemma 
games. 
 
Because your outcome in the resource management game is dependent upon 
the decisions of other people who are playing the same game, we cannot yet 
determine whether you will receive money, and how much. Once the study is 
complete, and everyone’s decisions are aggregated, we will contact you via 
email to let you know about the outcome. If you have earned money, then we 
will have it available for you to pick up in the Shiota Lab in the Psychology 
North Building on this campus. 
 
We understand that you may want to tell others about this research 
opportunity. That is fine, however, if you do, please do not inform them of the 
specific hypotheses. It is very important to our research that participants not 
come to this study with any preconceptions about what we are looking for. 
   
We appreciate your participation! If you have any further questions about our 
research, you may contact Dr. Michelle Shiota at Michelle.Shiota@asu.edu or 
Samantha Neufeld at Samantha.Neufeld@asu.edu.  
 
ASU Standard Rights:  If you have any questions about your rights as a 
participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can 
contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board, through 
the Office of Human Research Administration, at (480) 965-6788. 
 
Enjoy the rest of your semester, and thanks again for participating! 
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Table 1.  
Emotion Manipulation Check Results. Mean Self-Reported Emotion Scores for Each 
Emotion, by Emotion Condition. Scores were reported on a Likert scale from 0 (no 
emotion at all) to 8 (the strongest experience of this emotion I’ve ever felt).  
 
 
 
 
Self-Reported 
Emotion 
Emotion Condition 
  
    Neutral                 Guilt                  Pride  
 
Amusement 
 
3.57 
 
2.02 
 
4.01 
Anger 1.69 2.71 0.84 
Awe 0.79 1.16 3.10 
Disgust 1.38 2.84 0.61 
Embarrassment 1.53 4.05 1.02 
Enthusiasm 2.07 1.61 5.63 
Fear 
Guilt 
0.72 
1.05 
2.14 
5.14 
1.42 
0.53 
Happiness 2.57 1.65 6.73 
Love 1.74 2.58 3.90 
Pride 2.09 1.65 6.95 
Sadness 
Shame 
1.21 
0.92 
3.93 
4.17 
1.21 
0.68 
Tenderness 1.34 3.21 3.08 
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Table 2. 
Personality Subscale Results. This table summarizes findings for the 16 personality subscales: Reported 
are the number of items in each scale, Cronbach’s α for the entire sample, means and standard deviations, 
and the Betas and p-values for each subscale in each of the two Social Dilemma games. 
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Note. Significance values < .05 have one asterisk, significance values < .01 have two asterisks. TOSCA = 
Test of Self-Conscious Affect; EAI = Environmental Attitudes Inventory; PSB = Prosocial Personality 
Battery; DPES = Dispositional Positive Emotion Scale. 
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Figure 2. Consumption in Social Trap Game by Emotion and Participant Sex. Amount 
of money requested from $1,000 shared resource pool as a function of Emotion 
condition and Participant Sex in the Social Trap Game. 
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Figure 3. Contribution in Public Goods Dilemma Game by Emotion and Participant 
Sex. Amount of money contributed from $5 personal account to shared resource pool 
as a function of Emotion condition and Participant Sex in the Public Goods Dilemma 
Game. 
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Figure 4. Frequencies of Consumption Categories in Social Trap Game. Percent of 
Social Trap game participants in each Emotion condition requesting either under $10 
(prosocial decision), exactly $10 (cooperative decision), or over $10 (pro-self 
decision). 
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Figure 5. Frequencies of Contribution Categories in Public Goods Dilemma Game. 
Percent of Public Goods Dilemma game participants in each Emotion condition 
contributing either under $0 (entirely pro-self decision), $1-2 (somewhat pro-self 
decision), $3-4 (somewhat prosocial decision) or $5 (entirely prosocial decision). 
 
